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Abstract
How are computers typically perceived in co-creativity
scenarios? And how does this affect how we evaluate
computational creativity research systems that use co-
creativity? Recent research within computational cre-
ativity considers how to attribute creativity to computa-
tional agents within co-creative scenarios. Human eval-
uation forms a key part of such attribution or evalua-
tion of creative contribution. The use of human opin-
ion to evaluate computational creativity, however, runs
the risk of being distorted by conscious or subconscious
bias. The case study in this paper shows people are sig-
nificantly less confident at evaluating the creativity of a
whole co-creative system involving computational and
human participants, compared to the (already tricky)
task of evaluating individual creative agents in isolation.
To progress co-creativity research, we should combine
the use of co-creative computational models with the
findings of computational creativity evaluation research
into what contributes to software creativity.
Introduction
‘This experiment ... has plainly benefited from a
lot of human intervention ... To call it “computer-
generated” is misleading. “Computer-initiated” and
“computer-assisted”, though less grabby, are more
accurate - and in their own way provide a thought-
provoking novelty’ (Telegraph)1
‘[Humans] are, essentially, curating and correcting
the computers’ output’ (What’s on Stage)2
‘... the computer generated claim starts to unravel.
There’s no software that can put all of these elements
together and turn them into a musical. That requires a
human’ (Engadget UK)3
‘I do think the fundimentals [sic] are being nudged
by humans’ (kevlawdrums on Twitter, Mar 3 2016)
’it’s absolutely brilliant - but had a lot of human










These quotes relate to the ‘Beyond the Fence’ musical
theatre project (Colton et al. 2016), in which various compu-
tational creativity systems created parts of a musical. Com-
ments on the project included criticism that the project’s
billing as ‘the world’s first computer-generated musical’ was
misleading; it was ‘computer-assisted’ but not computer-
generated. The validity of describing the ‘Beyond the Fence’
project as an example of co-creativity between humans and
computers was not explored (Jordanous in press).
In a co-creative scenario involving human and computa-
tional participants, how do we attribute and evaluate the cre-
ative contributions of different types of participants? In par-
ticular, how do we evaluate computational participants rel-
ative to human participants, or relative to the system as a
whole? Although there have been many advances in com-
putational creativity evaluation tools to date, typically these
tools tend to assume we are evaluating a single piece of soft-
ware, working without creative contribution from other en-
tities. In co-creativity, there are more than one participants
contributing to the creative process, but often we cannot de-
lineate the specific contribution of each participant.
As discussed below, Bown (2015) has suggested attribut-
ing creative agency to different participants via studying the
dynamics of interaction and activities, following Maher’s
suggestions (Maher 2012) on determining individual and
collective creativity. While useful as an approach for how
to analyse the contributions of different participants to cre-
ativity, Bown acknowledges his proposal is ‘despite its long
standing in social sciences, quite a radical approach to think-
ing about attributing creative agency. This view removes the
privilege of the human actor’ (Bown 2015, p. 21)
Is computational creativity research at a stage where we
can afford to remove this ‘privilege of the human actor’
without consequence, or should we be more cautious in how
the contributions of creative systems are attributed in co-
creative scenarios? Following Colton (Colton 2008), who
closely links the perceived creativity of a system to evalua-
tion of creativity, we can rephrase this question:
Is there a problem of bias affecting how well we can
recognise computational participants’ contributions to
co-creative scenarios? If so, how could/should compu-
tational creativity researchers address this problem, to
make it easier to evaluate and acknowledge computa-
tional contributions to co-creativity?
This paper investigates this two-fold question, first con-
sidering what problems we should be concerned about in
attribution of creativity to computational co-creativity par-
ticipants. The term co-creativity is established and differ-
ent manifestations of co-creativity are explored. To under-
stand better what might be needed for an entity to be treated
as a potential co-creative participant, co-creativity scenar-
ios between humans and computers are compared to sce-
narios of collaboration between human participants, and to
scenarios involving creativity support tools. Broader ques-
tions are also considered, on how to acknowledge computa-
tional agents’ creativity and how our confidence in attribut-
ing creativity is affected by issues of biases. An experimen-
tal case study provides data to complement these more the-
oretical discussions, analysing how people judge a compu-
tational system in a co-creative scenario compared to if they
were under the impression that this computational system
was working in isolation (i.e. not in a co-creative scenario).
The paper concludes by discussing the implications for com-
putational co-creativity research; how can we evaluate the
creativity of co-creative computational agents, and justify
our conclusions - particularly to those not minded towards
accepting the possibility of computational creativity?
Background
In a 2005 journal special issue on human-computer creativ-
ity, Lubart4 provides a commentary on ‘How can comput-
ers be partners in the creative process’ (Lubart 2005). This
focus quickly moves, however, to the subtly but distinctly
different in meaning: ‘focus on ways that computers can
contribute to people’s creativity’. This de-emphasises the
concept of people contributing to computers’ creativity, or
of people and computers being treated as comparable cre-
ative contributors. A 2010 follow-up (Burkhardt and Lubart
2010) shows no particular concessions towards the idea that
computers could play a more creative role in co-creativity.
To echo Ada Lovelace’s words from two centuries earlier,
computers are seen as having ‘no pretensions whatever to
originate anything. It [the Analytical Engine] can do what-
ever we know how to order it to perform. ... Its province is to
assist us in making availablewhat we are already acquainted
with’ (Lovelace 1843) (emphasis in original).
More criticism arose around the possibility of a computa-
tional participant to be able to contribute to a set of creative
processes in more than a merely supplemental, assistive
way. One comment from critics reviewing the recent ‘Be-
yond the Fence’ musical theatre project (Colton et al. 2016)
was that the project’s billing as ‘the world’s first computer-
generated musical’ was in fact an inaccurate claim; the
project should instead have been described as ‘computer-
assisted’, not ‘computer-generated’ (Jordanous in press). As
discussed elsewhere (Jordanous in press), this was probably
a fair criticism that leads us to another useful question: how
could computational participants have made a more gen-
uinely co-creative contribution to this project?5
4This special issue predates by 11 years Lubart’s keynote at the
2016 International Conference on Computational Creativity.
5This specific question is tackled in Jordanous (in press).
To find evidence to argue for creative computational con-
tributions to co-creativity, we could make some attempt to
evaluate the creativity of computational agents using ex-
isting or new evaluation methods in computational creativ-
ity.6 This is problematic, however. Firstly, existing meth-
ods are poor for evaluating individual parts of a larger sys-
tem (Kantosalo, Toivanen, and Toivonen 2015; Jordanous in
press), though this has recently been investigated by drawing
upon evaluation methods from interaction design (Kantos-
alo, Toivanen, and Toivonen 2015). Secondly, and the focus
of this paper: evaluation of co-creative software can be heav-
ily affected by a deeper question around relative perceptions
of creativity in co-creative scenarios between humans and
computers. We want to better understand perceptions within
co-creativity and make sure we fully capture what evidence
is needed to justify claims that the co-creative software par-
ticipant(s) make valid contributions to co-creative scenarios.
What is co-creativity? Definition
Co-creativity can be modelled in many ways (Candy and
Edmonds 2002) but the basic requirement is that more
than one participant collaborates actively in a creative pro-
cess. In computational creativity research on co-creativity,
at least one of these participants is computational. Davis
(2013) treats co-creativity as a gestalt-like process, where
the creative participants contribute in a way which ‘the sum
is greater than the parts’ (rather than a ‘division of labor
model’ where tasks are divided up and allocated to partic-
ipants in the process (Davis 2013, p. 10). He sees co-
creativity as a ‘blend’ of collaborative improvisation by hu-
man and computational agents, ‘where a human and com-
puter both make creative contributions to an artwork’ (Davis
2013, p. 9). In particular, Davis focuses on a supposed ‘new
type of human-computer co-creativity’ (Davis 2013, p. 9):
‘that introduces a computer into this collaborative en-
vironment as an equal in the creative process ... in
which the human and computer improvise in real time
to generate a creative product. Here, creativity emerges
through the interaction of both the human and the com-
puter. ... The contributions of human and computer are
mutually influential, which is the nature of collabora-
tion and improvisation.’ (Davis 2013, p. 10)
This is modelled computationally using an enactive model
of cognition (Davis et al. 2015). Further examples of co-
creativity in computational models and creative software are
starting to emerge (Liapis, Yannakakis, and Togelius 2012;
Yannakakis, Liapis, and Alexopoulos 2014; Magerko et al.
2014; Grace and Maher 2014; Kantosalo, Toivanen, and
Toivonen 2015; Jacob and Magerko 2015).
Different types of co-creativity
In addressing the question ‘How can computers be part-
ners in the creative process’ (Lubart 2005), four differ-
ent roles are identified that computers can take in human-
computational co-creativity:
6For an overview and discussion of such methods, see the chap-
ters by Ritchie and by Jordanous in the forthcoming ‘RADIANCE’
Springer volume of Readings in Computational Creativity.
• ‘Computer as nanny’ [p. 366] (helping people to work as
efficiently as possible during creative tasks, for example
by minimising distractions).
• ‘Computer as penpal’ [p. 367] (an enabler for helping
humans to record and communicate their thoughts/ideas).
• ‘Computer as coach’ [p. 367] (‘an expert system, knowl-
edgeable in creativity-relevant techniques’, to help the
user to be more creative).
• ‘Computer as colleague’ [p. 368] (‘a real partnership, in
which humans and computers work hand in hand’).
Only the fourth of these roles suggests that computers
could play anything other than a restricted role in the cre-
ative process; however, sadly, even the discussion of ‘a real
partnership’ between computers and humans in the creative
process is tempered with the assertion that ‘Computers can
probably better implement random searches than humans
but humans are needed to select the best ideas and perhaps
to fine hone these ideas, turning them into viable creative
productions’. In other words, computers cannot be creative
(according to Lubart) except as an assistant for searching
and generating possibilities at random, at which point the
human must take over in order for the products of such a
partnership to be considered ‘viable creative productions’.
What is necessary in co-creativity for an entity to be
recognised as a co-creative participant? Specifically in the
context of co-creativity, we can consider how to recognise
the creativity of computational participants through analogy.
How is creativity of individual participants recognised in co-
creativity between human participants? What can we learn
from creativity support tools, that are designed specifically
to support human creativity? And what methods help us at-
tribute computational contributions to co-creativity?
Comparison with how we treat human collaborators in
a creative team comprised fully of human participants
Davis et al. (2015) use human collaboration and improvi-
sation as the basis for their model of human-computer co-
creativity. They discuss a ‘creative trajectory, which is the
shared understanding and intention to make creative con-
tributions in a mutually negotiated and desired direction’
(Davis 2013, p. 11). Co-creativity in general is therefore
treated by Davis et al. as a set of meaningful interactions
between creative partners, in a call-and-response type model
where each partner responds to the other’s communications.
Comparison with creativity support tools (CST) Davis
sees human-computational co-creativity as bridging a ‘gap
in the CST research literature on how computer colleagues
can contribute to the creative process’ (Davis 2013, p. 9).
Creativity support tools (Schneiderman 2007) focus on sup-
porting human creativity and disregard computational cre-
ativity. CST research tackles questions such as: ‘What tools,
methodologies, and practices can support creativity of indi-
viduals in interdisciplinary teams?’ (Mamykina, Candy, and
Edmonds 2002, emphasis in original). It is seen as an HCI
research area, not computational creativity/AI (Davis 2013).
Recognising computational agents’ creativity Maher
asks the question ‘Who’s Being Creative?’ in co-creative
scenarios with collaborations between different entities
(Maher 2012). In these collective creativity scenarios, Ma-
her points out that creative responsibility can be assigned
either to individuals within the co-creative scenario or to the
collective of entities involved. Maher proposes measuring
levels of ideation and interaction (suggestions overlapping
Bown’s later suggestions somewhat (Bown 2015)). Systems
can be categorised and ordered along two dimensions of
ideation, measured along axes that range from modelling to
generating, and from the ability to suggest, through enhance-
ment of ideas and to generation. Interaction modelling and
categorisation is similarly measured in terms of the number
of entities involved, human and computational.
Kantasalo et al. argue for a more complex approach:
human-computer co-creativity evaluation should be con-
ducted using mixed methods (Kantosalo, Toivanen, and
Toivonen 2015), with human opinion a crucial part of analy-
sis. To recognise creativity in an entity, of course, objective
systematic evaluation is not necessarily required. Eigenfeldt
et al. recognise (at least) five ways of validating the cre-
ativity of a system, by considering the perspectives of: the
architect of a system; the audience who engage with creative
outputs by the system; the academics engaging with publi-
cations about a system; domain experts engaging with the
system as peers and critics; and the results of controlled sys-
tem experiments (Eigenfeldt, Burnett, and Pasquier 2012).
Bown’s commentary emphasises the need to recognise
the contributions of different agents in the creative process
(Bown 2015) and looks at examples of how to do this. He
also reminds us that such recognition of creative contribu-
tion is necessary in the context of single computational cre-
ativity systems: ‘the “islands of creativity” problem’ (Bown
2015, p. 18) highlights the misconception that creativity
occurs solely within the bounds of a single creative agent
(human or computational). Creative agents engage with the
outside world in many ways, as per the ‘Press/Environment’
aspect of the Four Ps of creativity (Jordanous 2016; Rhodes
1961). Creative agents are influenced by external sources,
e.g. as audience or peer; and systems influence the world
around them by what they are doing. This is captured in
creativity models such as the DIFI domain-individual-field-
interaction model (Csikszentmihalyi 1988) or Hennessey
and Amabile’s (2010) systems take on creativity theory.
A dynamic analysis of creative systems has been of-
fered to analyse creative contributions from different entities
(Bown 2015), which defines creativity and the production of
output via (a) the interactions between agents and (b) the
notion of becoming: i.e. how things might be continually
dynamically re-created, rather than existing in a stable static
form. There is development from Maher’s (2012) proposals
to model creative systems via their ideation abilities and in-
teraction. In Bown’s examples of how to attribute creative
agency to participants, he outlines how the creative process
can be broken down into dynamic activities over a particular
timeline, and see how different activities involve or influ-
ence different entities. As example, he analyses the creativ-
ity of different participants in a musical performance involv-
ing two human musicians and various algorithmic perform-
ers. The collaboration is broken down into steps, helping to
identify where participants influence each other. (Here the
system designer is also considered a participant).
In situations where bias is carefully controlled, Bown’s
analysis provides detailed qualitative descriptions of cre-
ative contributions by the participants in the described sce-
narios. Sadly, such situations are rare in practice; the ap-
proach passes over the problems of bias (conscious or sub-
conscious) that arise in evaluation of computational creativ-
ity when computational participants’ creativity is examined.
The next section investigates these problems in more detail,
focusing on the context of co-creativity.
Bias and confidence in recognising creativity
To what extent do bias and differing levels of confidence in-
fluence research processes (particularly evaluation) in com-
putational creativity? In Davis’s work on co-creativity, it
is interesting to contrast (1) his repeated emphasis on the
equality of the partnership between human and computer in
co-creativity with (2) occasional deviations away from this
viewpoint in his writing, towards a view of the computer
as the more subservient partner in this process, supporting
human creativity without necessarily recognising any cre-
ativity on the part of the computational agent. For example
(emphases added): ‘The proposed system, Coco Sketch, en-
codes some rudimentary stylistic rules of abstract sketching
and music theory to contribute supplemental lines and mu-
sic while the user sketches.’ (Davis 2013, p. 9). Or: ‘Cre-
ative computers could understand and work alongside hu-
mans in a new hybrid form of human-computer co-creativity
that could inspire, motivate, and perhaps event each cre-
ativity to human users through collaboration.’ (Davis et al.
2015, p. 109) Evaluation in (Davis 2013) focuses on dis-
cussing/reporting and measuring the creativity of the human
participants in a human-computer co-creative scenario, with
the only evaluation of the computational participant’s con-
tribution being the use of Amabile’s Consensual Assessment
Technique to evaluate the creative output.
There is a place for soliciting human opinion in creativity
evaluation, not least as a simple way to consider the sys-
tem’s creativity in terms of those creative aspects which are
overly complex to define empirically, or which are most sen-
sitive to time and current societal context. Recognition of
computational creativity in general is however affected by a
number of different issues and challenges, many of which
are matters of significant, long-standing and/or continuous
debate both in the computational creativity community and
in research on human creativity. The perception of a com-
puter system as being creative (or potentially creative) is a
different issue to the question of whether a computer sys-
tem actually is creative (Colton 2008). Both of these issues
are relevant in this current description of the recognition of
the creativity of computational co-creativity participants, in
particular the first. Creativity has been described as being
‘in the eye of the beholder’ (Cardoso, Veale, and Wiggins
2009, p. 17). As emphasised in the Four Ps approach to cre-
ativity (Jordanous 2016), the opinions of the audience play
a key part in making, distributing and maintaining creativ-
ity judgements. Overcoming negative preconceptions about
computational creativity can therefore be a necessary hurdle
for computational creativity researchers to negotiate.
Practically it can be tricky to use human judges for eval-
uating creativity of a computational system. Human eval-
uators can make a tacit judgement on whether they think
something is creative but may find their decision difficult to
explain or justify (as investigated in Jordanous (2012b)). In a
case study asking people to assess the creativity of systems
(Jordanous 2012b), several participants requested a defini-
tion of creativity. This study also showed the variance in
human opinion; what some found creative, others did not.
While larger studies might capture consensus of opinion if it
exists, consensus is not necessarily a guaranteed result (Jor-
danous 2012a; 2012b).
People’s competence in evaluating computational creativ-
ity can be questioned (Lamb, Brown, and Clarke 2015);
evaluations can be influenced by preconceived notions and
beliefs. This perception has been discussed from sev-
eral different perspectives e.g. (Minsky 1982; Moffat and
Kelly 2006; Colton 2008; Nake 2009; Reffin-Smith 2010;
Pease and Colton 2011; Jordanous 2012b). People may
be reluctant to accept the concept of computers being cre-
ative, either through conscious reticence or subconscious
bias (Moffat and Kelly 2006). Researchers keen to embrace
computational creativity may be positively influenced to as-
sign a computational system more credit for creativity than
it perhaps deserves. In short, our ability to evaluate creative
systems objectively can be significantly affected once we
know (or suspect) we are evaluating a computer rather than
a human. Perhaps we evaluate systems differently to how we
evaluate people - and perhaps systems’ collaboration with
people distorts how we attribute creativity to that system?
Experimental work: an evaluative case study
The above questions probe how we recognise the creativity
of computational participants in co-creative scenarios, to as-
sist us in computational creativity evaluation. It would be
useful to have data to make comparative judgements of sys-
tems’ creativity in a co-creative context compared to outside
this context. In an ideal world, we could simply ask people
directly to compare the creativity of a system in a co-creative
context to its creativity when working on its own. Life is
not that simple, though; it is difficult to ask directly with-
out encountering subconscious bias or confusion over what
it means for computers to be creative (Jordanous 2012b).
Instead, in this case study, the aim is to collect a rough
consensus of opinion on how creative a system is: either
with the participants under the impression that the system
is operating independently on its own; or being informed
that the system is operating in a co-creative scenario with a
human user. This study investigates the two-part hypothesis:
i. People will vary in their evaluation of how creative
a system is considered to be, depending on the evalua-
tor’s impression of whether it is operating on its own or
whether it is operating in collaboration with human(s).
ii. People are more confident attributing creativity to
computational systems operating in isolation, than at-
tributing creativity to computational systems that oper-
ate within a co-creative scenario.
Such comparisons let us investigate if people consider a
co-creative system differently if treated as part of a com-
plete co-creative collaboration of human plus computational
participant (instead of evaluating the computational partic-
ipant in isolation from the human collaborator). The null
hypothesis, hence, is that there is no significant difference in
evaluation or in confidence of evaluation of a creative sys-
tem on whether it is co-creative or not, and regardless of if an
entire co-creative scenario is being evaluated or whether we
are evaluating individual participants within that scenario.
We compare the evaluations (and participants’ reported
confidence in evaluations) of the same system with people
under different impressions as to how much it collaborated
with other people, and compare the evaluations of the sys-
tem in isolation to the system as part of a bigger co-creative
system of collaboration. We also compare confidence levels
for evaluations of a co-creative system (either treating the
‘system’ (1) as all participants, human and computational,
or (2) just evaluating the computational participant), against
confidence in evaluating a computational system that works
in isolation, with no human-computer interaction.
Method
Three groups of participants were used for this study, each
with a minimum of 30 participants. Participants were asked
to indicate their opinions on how creative a co-creative com-
puter system is, and were also asked to indicate how con-
fident they were about their answer. The participants were
given a brief description of how the system works (using
non-technical language and avoiding jargon). They were
also provided with sample outputs of the system.
The co-creative system used in this study is the Impro-
Visor (Keller 2012) musical improvisation system, which
works in conjunction with human student users to generate
jazz music in the style of improvised solos. Impro-Visor is
intended as a tool to help people develop their ability to con-
struct jazz solos. It learns musical grammars from corpora of
jazz music and uses those as generative grammars to suggest
solos which can be developed by the human user.7
The three groups were divided according to how they
were asked to approach this task:
• Group 1: Treat Impro-Visor as part of a co-creative sys-
tem, evaluated separately from the human user participat-
ing in the co-creative process
• Group 2: Treat Impro-Visor + human user, considering
both as parts of a human-computer co-creative system
• Group 3: Treat Impro-Visor as a standalone creative sys-
tem, not a co-creative system
Group 1 evaluated Impro-Visor specifically as the com-
putational participant in a co-creative scenario, i.e. consid-
ering the software participant’s creativity. Group two evalu-
ated how creative the co-creative system was as a whole, i.e.
Impro-Visor and the human user. Data for both groups 1 and
2 were collected during lectures on computational creativity
evaluation, to students at undergraduate or MSc level. The
7Although Impro-Visor recently gained functionality for col-
laborative real-time improvisation with a user (Keller et al. 2012),
this functionality was not included in the evaluation case study.
exercises were completed at the start of these lectures, be-
fore the students had been given any information from the
lecturer on computational creativity evaluation; the teaching
purpose of the exercise was to get students to think prac-
tically about how to evaluate creative systems, and prompt
them to consider to themselves the issues that arise, prior to
any discussions of this in the teaching session.
The third group’s data was collected slightly differently.
In fact, this study was originally inspired by a previous -
and aborted - data collection for an evaluative case study
involving Impro-Visor, conducted under a false impression
that the output samples used for the case study were indeed
generated purely by the system in question working inde-
pendently. Later it was discovered (personal communica-
tions with Bob Keller, 2012), that the system outputs were
the result of the system and a human user in collaboration.
This was unfortunate for the original study, but a serendipi-
tous inspiration and source of data for this study. This orig-
inal data on evaluation of Impro-Visor seemingly as a stan-
dalone system, not collaborating with a human user but op-
erating autonomously, was collected via an online survey for
(Jordanous 2012b) that presented participants with descrip-
tions of four musical improvisation systems and their out-
puts. Participants were asked how creative they thought each
system was, and to give their confidence in their decision.
Groups 1 and 2 evaluated Impro-Visor as a second task
after performing a similar evaluation of a non-co-creative
system Tale-Spin (Meehan 1976). The main purpose of the
Tale-Spin evaluation was mostly to give the participants a
practice evaluation task. Though it also provides data to
compare the confidence of participants in groups 1 and 2
at evaluating a co-creative system compared to a non-co-
creative system, such analysis is limited; many factors influ-
ence why we may be more confident evaluating one system
than another (as shown by comments made in the study).
Of course the evaluation of one system compared to an-
other unrelated system in a different domain does not give
us any sort of complete picture as to how people treat sys-
tems in co-creative scenarios compared to non-collaborative
scenarios. While the data from evaluation of Tale-Spin is
interesting as some sort of yardstick, the evaluation task for
Tale-Spin is essentially a practice exercise before the main
exercise we are interested in collecting data for.
For the evaluative exercise, the participants were asked:
“How creative do you think the XXX system is?” (substitut-
ing for XXX the system perspective they were being asked
to consider, based on whether they were in group 1, 2 or
3). Ratings of creativity were collected using a five-point
labelled Likert scale 0-4: [0] Not at all creative, [1] A little
creative but not very, [2] Quite creative, [3] Very creative, [4]
Completely creative. Then participants were asked: “How
confident are you about the answer you just gave for XXX
system’s creativity?” (substituting for XXX the system per-
spective they were being asked to consider). Ratings of con-
fidence were also collected using a five-point labelled Likert
scale 0-4: [0] Very unconfident, [1] Unconfident, [2] Neu-
tral, [3] Confident, [4] Very confident.
Table 1: Data on ratings of Impro-Visor creativity on the 0-4 scale,
from ‘Not at all creative’ to ‘Completely creative’
Group 1 2 3
N 34 50 120
mean 1.91 1.93 1.88
median 2.00 2.00 2.00
mode 2.00 2.00 2.00
std dev 0.723 0.874 0.913
Results of case study
A summary of the collected data is given in Tables 1 and 2.
A two-tailed t-test was used to compare whether there were
significant differences in ratings in confidence between the
three groups, with significance set to p ≤= 0.05.
The first set of tests tested the null hypothesis that there
was no significant difference in ratings for Impro-Visor’s
creativity, across the three groups (i.e. first comparing group
1 and group 2, then comparing group 1 and group 3, then
finally comparing group 2 and group 3). No significant ev-
idence was found to disprove the null hypothesis; in other
words none of the three different perspectives taken on
Impro-Visor significantly affected how creative the system
was perceived to be. Across each of the three groups, the
Impro-Visor system was rated at between 1.88 mean (group
3) and 1.93 (group 2). This implies a rating of between 2
(‘Quite creative’) and 1 (‘A little creative but not very’).
The second set of tests tested the null hypothesis that
there was no significant difference in confidence for rating
Impro-Visor’s creativity between pairwise combinations of
the three groups. The alternative hypothesis is that a signifi-
cant difference in confidence has been found.
In comparing groups 1 and 3, i.e. comparing the confi-
dence in rating the Impro-Visor software individually as a
co-creative participant and as a standalone piece of software
that does not collaborate with a human, a p value of 0.06
meant that although close to being significant, there is no
statistical evidence for a significant difference in confidence.
In the other two pairwise combinations, however, significant
evidence was found to reject the null hypothesis.
Comparing groups 2 and 3, i.e. considering the collective
creativity of Impro-Visor and the human user compared to
the creativity of Impro-Visor as a standalone program, a p-
value of 0.00002 indicated strongly significant evidence of
a difference in confidence levels. Remembering that a con-
fidence rating of 3 represents an answer: ‘Confident’, and 2
represents an answer: ‘Neutral’, a mean of 2.74 for confi-
dence in ratings for group 3 contrasts against a mean of 2.02
for group 2. In other words, participants were signifi-
cantly more confident at rating the creativity of Impro-
Visor if they were under the false impression that it was
operating on its own, without user collaboration - com-
pared to trying to rate the collective creativity of Impro-
Visor and the human user together.
Participants were also significantly lower in confidence
(p=0.038) at completing the latter task compared to the
confidence levels showed by group 1 participants, who
Table 2: Data on confidence of participants in providing ratings
of Impro-Visor creativity. On the 0-4 scale, this ranges from ‘Very
unconfident’ to ‘Very confident’
Group 1 2 3
N 34 50 120
mean 2.44 2.02 2.74
median 2.50 2.00 3.00
mode 3.00 3.00 3.00
sd 0.801 1.008 0.912
had to rate the creativity of Impro-Visor as an individual
participant in this co-creativity scenario.
Using t-tests, comparisons were also made between the
confidence of participants rating Impro-Visor’s creativity
compared to their confidence in rating Tale-Spin’s creativ-
ity, for participants in groups 1 and 2 who evaluated both
systems. However no significant evidence was found to
show that participants felt more or less confident rating the
co-creative system Impro-Visor, compared to the standalone
system Tale-Spin. This was as expected, due to the many
factors that influence confidence in evaluating systemsbased
on differences in processes, products and domain.
Discussion
Regarding the hypothesis under investigation The data
shows that while there seems to be little significant differ-
ence in the level of creativity attributed to Impro-Visor, peo-
ple typically felt significantly less confident about evaluating
the creativity of a co-creative system of human and com-
puter participants, compared to evaluating the creativity of
the computational participant, or if they were under the im-
pression that the co-creative system was actually working as
a standalone system with no human collaborator.
One explanation of the data may be that the participants
would generally feel less confident about assigning creativ-
ity to a collaborative group of participants, compared to at-
tributing creativity to individual participants within that cre-
ative scenario. To understand retrospectively how partici-
pants decided on their rankings, we can look at the qualita-
tive data collected during the case study described above.
Many participants took advantage of the option to add
qualitative comments to support their evaluation data. In the
group 3 evaluation scenario, though many comments were
given on the musicality of the system, only one participant
from the 120 participants involved made a comment about
their confidence in their answer:
‘I liked this one better than the other ones, but am really
struggling to distinguish between “like” or “approve” and
“think it’s creative”.’ [User rated Impro-Visor as 3 for cre-
ativity and 3 for confidence]
In groups 1 and 2, more participants commented on their
confidence in performing these evaluative tasks. For those
in group 2, where participants were evaluating the collective
co-creative system of software plus human, no comments at
all were made about any difficulties in attributing creativ-
ity collectively to a pair of creative collaborators rather than
to the individual participants involved. Of the comments
that were made, the following are interesting for showing
people’s attitudes to the computational participant in the co-
creative scenario [their ratings for creativity of Impro-Visor
and their indicated confidence are given in brackets]:
“The system has the student to help out on creativity.”
[creativity=1, confidence=3]
“These systems can’t evaluate their own creativity. The
main difference is the human input” [creativity=1, confi-
dence=2]
In group 1, where the participants were typically lower
in confidence than the other two groups in their evalua-
tions, evaluating the collective co-creative system of Impro-
Visor plus its human user, similar indications were still
given as to the relative creative contributions of each partici-
pant. One participant underlined the reference to the human
user in their answer of how creative the system of ‘com-
puter+human’ was, presumably to indicate that their attri-
bution of a creativity rating of 2 was because of the human
participant (given with a confidence rating of 2). Other inter-
esting comments made by this group’s participants included:
“The music sounds like it could have been made by a
human alone whereas the story seemed computer generated
rather than human written.” [creativity=3, confidence=3]
“Quite creative based on the human influence.” [creativ-
ity=2, confidence=1]
“human element helps with the confidence and knowing
more about the workings.” [creativity=3, confidence=3]
“If I take into account the fact that a computer was in-
volved I tend to (rather silly and unrealistically) consider the
whole system less creative. Bias towards human creativity!”
[creativity=2, confidence=1]
“Impro-Visor: Don’t know how much input came from
the musician (pre-knowledge?) and how much came from the
system?” [creativity=2, confidence=1]
Despite these comments, the data on creativity ratings does
not show that people gave significantly higher ratings when
considering the human as a part of the co-creative system
being evaluated (group 2, with a mean of 1.93 for creativity
rating compared to 1.91 for group 1 and 1.88 for group 3).
Those who added extra comments, however, wished to indi-
cate their reliance on the human part of this co-creative sys-
tem. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, no participants indicated the
opposite sentiment that the computational element helped
them feel more confident about their evaluation than if eval-
uating only the human participant.
Conclusions and implications for future work
How are computers typically perceived in co-creativity sce-
narios? The study reported here supports the literature re-
view suggestions that participants are less confident attribut-
ing creativity in collective co-creativity scenarios including
computational participants, arguably because of a reluctance
to assign creative agency to computational participants.
The data from the case study in this paper shows that
while there seems to be little significant difference in the
level of creativity attributed to Impro-Visor, people typically
felt significantly less confident about evaluating the creativ-
ity of a co-creative system of human and computer partici-
pants, compared to evaluating the creativity of the computa-
tional participant, or if they were under the impression that
the co-creative system was actually working as a standalone
system with no human collaborator. People typically felt
‘Neutral’ in their confidence of judging the collective cre-
ativity of a human-computer collaboration, compared to half
way between ‘Neutral’ and ‘Confident’ for rating the system
individually in this co-creative scenario, and three-quarters
of the way from ‘Neutral’ to ‘Confident’ for participants’
average confidence in rating Impro-Visor’s creativity if they
had thought the system was working autonomously.
Bown has suggested a working model for how to attribute
creative agency to different participants in human-computer
co-creativity, based on interactions and dynamic tracing of
influence in the creative activities (Bown 2015). This builds
on previous suggestions to model co-creative systems indi-
vidually or collectively via measuring ideation and social in-
teractions in the systems (Maher 2012) and mixed methods
(Kantosalo, Toivanen, and Toivonen 2015). There is a cer-
tain level of naivety to these approaches - understandable
given the desire to move forwards in a more objective and
methodical approach for attributing creative agency in co-
creativity. With these approaches, we have a decent theoret-
ical starting point; but nonetheless further attention needs to
be paid to practical issues that arise in their application.
Human evaluation should indeed be used to recognise
and assess the contribution of computational participants
in human-computer co-creativity (Kantosalo, Toivanen, and
Toivonen 2015). What, though, needs to be done for com-
puters to be perceived as genuine partners in a co-creative
process, making a creative contribution? How can we
demonstrate that in creative scenarios, computational soft-
ware is not merely limited to the remit of creativity sup-
port tools, supporting human creativity, but can become (and
exceed the requirements of) a creative ‘colleague’ (Lubart
2005)? Can we even aim for a point at which human cre-
ativity can be seen to support computational creativity?
These are not simple questions to answer, but they should
not be passed over. With computational creativity models
and software, we can, and have, explored such questions
further, to advance understanding of co-creativity more gen-
erally. As discussed above, ongoing evaluative research on
what makes software appear creative (or what makes soft-
ware actually creative?) helps us pursue these questions.
Once we better understand how to deal with inherent con-
scious/subconscious biases involved in human evaluation of
computational creativity, our working approaches for cre-
ativity attribution become more useful as a basis for accu-
rately recognising creative agency in co-creative software.
References
Bown, O. 2015. Attributing creative agency: Are we doing it right?
In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Computa-
tional Creativity. Park City, UT: ACC.
Burkhardt, J.-M., and Lubart, T. 2010. Creativity in the age of
emerging technology: Some issues and perspectives in 2010. Cre-
ativity and Innovation management 19(2):160–166.
Candy, L., and Edmonds, E. 2002. Modeling co-creativity in art
and technology. In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference
on Creativity and Cognition, 134–141. Loughborough, UK: ACM.
Cardoso, A.; Veale, T.; and Wiggins, G. A. 2009. Converging on
the Divergent: The History (and Future) of the International Joint
Workshops in Computational Creativity. AI Magazine 30(3):15–
22.
Colton, S.; Llano, M. T.; Hepworth, R.; Charnley, J.; Gale, C. V.;
Baron, A.; Pachet, F.; Roy, P.; Gervas, P.; Collins, N.; Sturm, B.;
Weyde, T.; Wolff, D.; and Lloyd, J. 2016. The beyond the fence
musical and computer says show documentary. In 7th Interna-
tional Conference on Computational Creativity (ICCC 2016). Paris
(France): ACC.
Colton, S. 2008. Creativity versus the Perception of Creativity in
Computational Systems. In Proceedings of AAAI Symposium on
Creative Systems, 14–20. Stanford, CA: AAAI.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. 1988. Society, culture, and person: a systems
view of creativity. In Sternberg, R. J., ed., The Nature of Creativity.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. chapter 13, 325–
339.
Davis, N.; Hsiao, C.-P.; Popova, Y.; and Magerko, B. 2015. An
enactive model of creativity for computational collaboration and
co-creation. In Zagalo, N., and Branco, P., eds., Creativity in the
Digital Age. London, UK: Springer. 109–133.
Davis, N. 2013. Human computer co-creativity: Blending human
and computational creativity. In Smith, G., and Smith, A., eds.,
Proceedings of the Doctoral Consortium of Artificial Intelligence
and Interactive Digital Entertainment Conference (AIIDE) 2013,
number WS-13-23 in AAAI Technical Report, 9–12. Boston, MA:
AAAI.
Eigenfeldt, A.; Burnett, A.; and Pasquier, P. 2012. Evaluating mu-
sical metacreation in a live performance context. In International
Conference on Computational Creativity, 140.
Grace, K., and Maher, M. L. 2014. Towards computational
co-creation in modding communities. In Proceedings of AIIDE.
AAAI.
Hennessey, B. A., and Amabile, T. M. 2010. Creativity. Annual
Review of Psychology 61:569–598.
Jacob, M., and Magerko, B. 2015. Interaction-based authoring
for scalable co-creative agents. In Toivonen, H.; Colton, S.; Cook,
M.; and Ventura, D., eds., Proceedings of the Sixth International
Conference on Computational Creativity, 236–243. Park City, UT:
ACC.
Jordanous, A. 2012a. A Standardised Procedure for Evaluating
Creative Systems: Computational Creativity Evaluation Based on
What it is to be Creative. Cognitive Computation 4(3):246–279.
Jordanous, A. 2012b. Evaluating Computational Creativity: A
Standardised Procedure for Evaluating Creative Systems and its
Application. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Sussex, Brighton,
UK.
Jordanous, A. 2016. Four PPPPerspectives on computational cre-
ativity in theory and in practice. Connection Science 28(2):194–
216.
Jordanous, A. in press. Has computational creativity successfully
made it ‘Beyond the Fence’ in musical theatre? Connection Sci-
ence.
Kantosalo, A.; Toivanen, J. M.; and Toivonen, H. 2015. Interac-
tion evaluation for human-computer co-creativity: A case study. In
Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Computational
Creativity. Park City, UT: ACC.
Keller, R. M.; Toman-Yih, A.; Schofield, A.; and Merrit, Z. 2012.
A creative improvisational companion based on idiomatic har-
monic bricks. In Maher, M. L.; Hammond, K.; Pease, A.; Pe´rez
y Pe´rez, R.; Ventura, D.; and Wiggins, G., eds., Proceedings of
the Third International Conference on Computational Creativity,
155–159. ACC.
Keller, R. M. 2012. Continuous improvisation and trading with
Impro-Visor. In Maher, M. L.; Hammmond, K.; Pease, A.; Pe´rez
y Pe´rez, R.; Ventura, D.; and Wiggins, G., eds., Proceedings of
the Third International Conference on Computational Creativity.
ACC.
Lamb, C.; Brown, D. G.; and Clarke, C. 2015. Human competence
in creativity evaluation. In Toivonen, H.; Colton, S.; Cook, M.;
and Ventura, D., eds., Proceedings of the Sixth International Con-
ference on Computational Creativity (ICCC 2015), 102–109. Park
City, Utah: Brigham Young University.
Liapis, A.; Yannakakis, G. N.; and Togelius, J. 2012. Co-creating
game content using an adaptive model of user taste. In Maher,
M. L.; Hammond, K.; Pease, A.; Pe´rez y Pe´rez, R.; Ventura, D.;
and Wiggins, G., eds., Proceedings of the Third International Con-
ference on Computational Creativity. ACC.
Lovelace, A. 1843. Notes on Manabrea’s Sketch of the Analytical
Engine Invented by Charles Babbage. In Bowden, B., ed., Faster
than thought : a symposium on digital computing machines (1953).
London: Pitman.
Lubart, T. 2005. How can computers be partners in the creative
process: Classification and commentary on the special issue. Inter-
national Journal of Human-Computer Studies 63:365–369.
Magerko, B.; Permar, J.; Jacob, M.; Comerford, M.; and Smith, J.
2014. An overview of computational co-creative pretend play with
a human. In Proceedings of the Playful Characters worksop at the
Fourteenth Annual Conference on Intelligent Virtual Agents.
Maher, M. L. 2012. Computational and Collective Creativity:
Who’s Being Creative? In Proceedings of the 3rd International
Conference on Computer Creativity. Dublin, Ireland: ACC.
Mamykina, L.; Candy, L.; and Edmonds, E. 2002. Collaborative
creativity. Communications of the ACM 45(10):96–99.
Meehan, J. R. 1976. The metanovel: writing stories by computer.
Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA.
Minsky, M. L. 1982. Why people think computers can’t. AI Mag-
azine 3(4):3.
Moffat, D. C. D. C., and Kelly, M. 2006. An investigation into
people’s bias against computational creativity in music composi-
tion. In The Third Joint Workshop on Computational Creativity.
Nake, F. 2009. Creativity in algorithmic art. In Proceedings of the
2009 Conference on Creativity and Cognition, 97–106.
Pease, A., and Colton, S. 2011. On impact and evaluation in Com-
putational Creativity: A discussion of the Turing Test and an alter-
native proposal. In Proceedings of the AISB’11 Convention. York,
UK: AISB.
Reffin-Smith, B. 2010. 43 Dodgy Statements on Computer
Art. http://zombiepataphysics.blogspot.com/2010/03/43-dodgy-
statements-on-computer-art.html, last accessed 29th July 2010.
Rhodes, M. 1961. An analysis of creativity. Phi Delta Kappan
42(7):305–310.
Schneiderman, B. 2007. Creativity support tools: accelerating
discovery and innovation. Communications of the ACM 50(12):20–
32.
Yannakakis, G. N.; Liapis, A.; and Alexopoulos, C. 2014. Mixed-
initiative co-creativity. In Proceedings of the 9th Conference on the
Foundations of Digital Games.
